



RAIL2X

Slawa Lang, Siemens Mobility GmbH; "Rail2X" consortium Safety meets Security 2019

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## How secure is an ITS communication system and can it be extended to rail traffic?





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# C-ITS

### Intelligent Transportation Systems

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# ITS shall make (road) traffic safer, more environmentally friendly, more efficient and more comfortable



Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)



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Essential for ITS is communication: Traffic participant ↔ other participant Traffic participant ↔ infrastructure

→ Cooperative-ITS (C-ITS)

In road traffic: Car2X, Car2Car communication

# Vehicle2X uses special Wi-Fi, but 5G mobile communications could be used too

![](_page_5_Picture_1.jpeg)

Vehicle2X – Standardization activities, frequency allocation

![](_page_5_Figure_3.jpeg)

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![](_page_6_Picture_0.jpeg)

# Rail2X

### Vehicle2X technology in rail traffic

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# Road ITS shall be adapted to rail traffic, to facilitate efficient services

![](_page_7_Picture_1.jpeg)

#### **Rail2X – Smart Services**

Adaptation of Wi-Fi Car2X communication to rail traffic / for rail ITS

- $\rightarrow$  increased safety
- $\rightarrow$  improved comfort
- → more efficient maintenance
- $\rightarrow$  cost reduction

![](_page_7_Figure_8.jpeg)

# Feasibility and reasonableness are demonstrated based on 3 use cases at Erzgebirgsbahn

![](_page_8_Picture_1.jpeg)

### Rail2X – Use cases

1: Service and diagnosis

![](_page_8_Picture_4.jpeg)

Data exchange Infrastructure ↔ train

 $\rightarrow$  inexpensive data capturing  $\rightarrow$  more efficient maintenance

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### 2: Barrier crossing on call

![](_page_8_Picture_9.jpeg)

Information exchange Vehicle ↔ level crossing

 $\rightarrow$  increased safety

 $\rightarrow$  improved comfort

### 3: Request stop

![](_page_8_Picture_14.jpeg)

Information exchange Train  $\leftrightarrow$  station

 $\rightarrow$  inexpensive communication  $\rightarrow$  more efficient regional traffic

### Data can be captured inexpensively and analyzed centrally

#### Use case 1: Service and diagnosis

- Collection of (sensor) data at important infrastructure locations (e.g. points)
- Collection of data by passing trains with Rail2X
- Transfer of data to central server e.g. in depot
- Saving and analysis of data at central place
- → inexpensive data capturing without permanent communication link
- → more efficient maintenance

![](_page_9_Picture_9.jpeg)

![](_page_9_Picture_10.jpeg)

### Concept of barrier on call remains by more efficient log on and off

![](_page_10_Picture_1.jpeg)

### Use case 2: Barrier crossing on call

- Barrier on call: normally closed, opens upon logging on (if safe)
- Traffic participants without Vehicle2X: manual log on and off as usual
- Traffic participants with Vehicle2X: automatic log on and off via communication with level crossing; display of acknowledgement
- $\rightarrow$  improved comfort
- $\rightarrow$  shorter waiting times
- $\rightarrow$  increased safety

![](_page_10_Picture_9.jpeg)

### Regional traffic becomes efficient by inexpensive and comfortable **SIEMENS** request stops Ingenuity for Life

#### Use case 3: Request stop

- Request stop: Train stops only upon request of passengers in train or at station
- Transmission of stop request at station to train via Rail2X
- Transmission 'Train stops' from train to station via Rail2X
- $\rightarrow$  improved comfort
- $\rightarrow$  inexpensive communication
- $\rightarrow$  more efficient regional traffic

![](_page_11_Picture_8.jpeg)

### A hopping station increases communication range

![](_page_12_Picture_1.jpeg)

### **Hopping station**

- Hopping station: forwards Rail2X messages
- Placement e.g. in curves without line of sight

 $\rightarrow$  increased communication range

![](_page_12_Picture_6.jpeg)

#### Data shall be collected, analyzed and used for better maintenance **SIEMENS** among others

System environment with data server

![](_page_13_Figure_2.jpeg)

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![](_page_14_Picture_0.jpeg)

### **ITS-G5 PKI**

Security architecture of Vehicle2X communication

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# There exist different kinds of ITS messages which shall fulfill different security goals

![](_page_15_Picture_1.jpeg)

Message models

![](_page_15_Figure_3.jpeg)

![](_page_15_Picture_4.jpeg)

Authentication, authorization, integrity

![](_page_15_Picture_6.jpeg)

Authentication, authorization, integrity, privacy

All

All

### Individual Private Messages or Security Associations (unicast)

![](_page_15_Picture_10.jpeg)

Authentication, authorization, integrity, confidentiality, (privacy)

Specific recipient

Security Association:

- Setting up of a secure communication channel
- Confidential
   communication

### How to establish a secure communication between ITS-stations?

![](_page_16_Picture_1.jpeg)

**PKI architecture / C-ITS trust model** 

How to establish a secure communication between ITS-stations?

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# First the ITS-station registers with its predefined profile at the EA, to obtain eligibility

![](_page_17_Picture_1.jpeg)

### **PKI architecture / C-ITS trust model**

- 1) ITS-station obtains ID, keys and profile from manufacturer or operator, e.g. in form of a BC
- ITS-station requests eligibility at EA with BC
- After review EA issues general eligibility to participate at ITS in form of EC

![](_page_17_Figure_6.jpeg)

# Then the ITS-station requests from the AA specific, pseudonymized authorizations

### PKI architecture / C-ITS trust model

- 4) ITS-station requests specific authorizations at AA with EC
- 5) AA reviews EC via consultation with EA (AA does not obtain true identity of ITS-station)
- 6) AA issues authorizations in form of ATs (with data unknown to EA)

![](_page_18_Figure_5.jpeg)

SIEMENS Ingenuity for life With authorizations communication is possible, in accordance with the principles authentication, authorization, privacy

**PKI architecture / C-ITS trust model** 

![](_page_19_Figure_2.jpeg)

![](_page_19_Picture_3.jpeg)

7)

### EAs and AAs obtain permission to issue certificates from a Root **Certification Authority**

### PKI architecture / C-ITS trust model

- Root Certification Authority (CA) is highest certification authority and certifies that EAs and AAs can issue ECs or ATs resp.
- There can be a single Root CA as an absolute entity or several Root CAs which verify each other
- Concrete: set of Root CA certificates is in place and known to all. One can apply for a certificate.

From standard: ETSI TS 102 940

![](_page_20_Figure_7.jpeg)

![](_page_20_Figure_8.jpeg)

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![](_page_21_Picture_0.jpeg)

### **ITS-G5** security

Security aspects of Vehicle2X communication

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# Security Services operate within the layers of the communication architecture, as well as across in the management

![](_page_22_Picture_1.jpeg)

### **ITS security in communication architecture**

Security Services offer

- Authentication
- Authorization
- Accountability
- Integrity
- Confidentiality
- Privacy

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Availability

### From standard: ETSI TS 102 940

![](_page_22_Figure_12.jpeg)

ITS Applications		OS	I model	ITS Applications	Security Management Enrolment Authorization
Facilities Manage Security Association	Application Layer	>	Application Layer	Facilities Manage Security Association	Remote management (Note) Report misbehaviour Identity management
Send secured message across SA Payload encryption Key management Insert payload sequence number Time-stamp payload	Presentation Layer		Presentation Layer	Receive secure message from SA Payload plausibility validation Validate payload integrity Payload decryption Validate payload sequence number	
Identification	Session Layer	$ \rightarrow $	Session Layer	Validate payload time-stamp Identification	
Networking & Transport Manage Security Association Authorize message Sign message	Transport Layer		Transport Layer	Networking & Transport Manage Security Association Validate message authorization Validate message integrity	
Encrypt message Insert message generation time Insert message sequence number Identification	Network Layer		Network Layer	Verify signature Decrypt message Validate message generation time Validate message sequence number Identification	
Access				Access	
Identification	Data Link Layer		Data Link Layer	Identification	
	Physical Layer		Physical Layer		Hardware Security Module (HSM)

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# An HSM is responsible for communication encryption and PKI handling

![](_page_23_Picture_1.jpeg)

Hardware Security Modul (HSM)

### HSM:

- Secure saving of private keys
- Secure execution of cryptographic functions
- Access to sensible data / keys only with explicit permission and via protected interfaces
- Siemens ESCoS RSU has an HSM

![](_page_23_Figure_8.jpeg)

From standard: ETSI TS 102 940

![](_page_24_Picture_0.jpeg)

### **Rail ITS PKI**

Structure of PKI for rail-specific ITS applications

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### A rail-specific sub-PKI as part of the whole ITS PKI is conceivable

![](_page_25_Picture_1.jpeg)

![](_page_25_Figure_2.jpeg)

![](_page_26_Picture_0.jpeg)

Thank you for your attention.

RAĨL<sup>2</sup>X

### **Questions?**

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2 14

5 11 4

![](_page_26_Picture_5.jpeg)

![](_page_26_Picture_6.jpeg)

![](_page_26_Picture_7.jpeg)

![](_page_26_Picture_8.jpeg)

![](_page_26_Picture_9.jpeg)

### **Contacts**

![](_page_27_Picture_1.jpeg)

![](_page_27_Picture_2.jpeg)

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